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ARTICLES
PROFESSIONALISM AND COMMERCIALISM
The Ninth Blankenbaker Lecture*
Justin A. Stanley**
One has to go back a long, long way in the history of Western
civilization to find a time when there was not a motivating rela-
tionship between professionalism and commercialism in the law.
At one point, of course, there was no special group which was
trained in the law. This was certainly true in Athens at the time of
Socrates in the late fifth century B.C. Indeed, Socrates complained
to Protagoras in one of the dialogues that when the Athenian As-
sembly had to deal with a construction project, it sent for builders
to advise it. If a naval fleet was to be expanded, it sent for ship-
wrights. But when it was considering issues of government and law,
"then everybody is free to have a say-carpenter, tinker, cobbler,
merchant, sea-captain; rich and poor, high and low-anyone who
likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case,
and not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving ad-
vice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort
of knowledge cannot be taught."'
This is not to say that the Greeks were unaware of the impor-
tance of law and the use and purposes of courts or assemblies.
Quite the contrary was true-and men such as Socrates and Aris-
totle discussed in words that are still read the importance of jus-
* Joseph N. Blankenbaker was a long-time Montana resident who, "to express his
thanks to the people of Montana," founded the Blankenbaker Foundation in 1975. The
Blankenbaker Foundation provides an annual endowment to the University of Montana
School of Law for educational programs in professional responsibility, including the
Blankenbaker Lecture series. Justin A. Stanley delivered the Ninth Blankenbaker Lecture
at the University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana, on April 22, 1988.
** B.A., Dartmouth College, 1933; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1937. Mr. Stanley is a
partner in the firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois. A past president of both the
Chicago Bar Association and the American Bar Association, Mr. Stanley chaired the ABA
Commission on Professionalism which issued a comprehensive report in 1986. Mr. Stanley
received the ABA Medal in 1986.
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tice and accepted legal principles and even the distinctions be-
tween law and equity.! There just was not a body of lawyers.
It strikes me, though, that there must have been quite a num-
ber of able pro se advocates. Of course, in time, a group of experts
or specialists did emerge.
As late as 200 B.C. in Rome, however, even though the exper-
tise was acknowledged, the payment of fees for legal services was
proscribed.$ A hundred years later the experts were called "speak-
ers of cases" and fees were permitted." Certainly by the fifth and
sixth century fees were permitted, but they were legislatively
fixed.
5
I am not certain if fees for legal advice were ever proscribed in
England. There was probably little need for legal advice during the
Anglo-Saxon period.6 However, as English civilization became
more sophisticated, refinements in law and the legal system oc-
curred, and certainly by the time of Henry II,7 I think it can safely
be said that lawyers were recognized as experts and were paid fees
for their services.' That system has been with us ever since. Even
so, fees did not tend to be an important part of the lawyer-client
relationship. Perhaps the role of the church in legal education and
in its separate courts for many years continued the notion that
compensation should be a minor factor in that relationship.'
In some respects, I suppose that the practice during our Colo-
nial period and for some time thereafter of requiring law clerks to
pay for the privilege of working in law offices may have tended to
minimize the importance of financial gain for lawyers. Incidentally,
2. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 1020 (R. Mc-
Keon ed. 1941).
3. J. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 89-90 (1967). Crook says:
It would be wrong to think of jurisprudence in the Republican age as a profession.
Its practitioners were members of the Roman upper class, for whom even public
and political office were only incidents in lives of leisure, and it was therefore an
amateur activity just as much as being a historian or an agricultural expert....
The main rule, going back to a law of 204 B.C., was that barristers were not al-
lowed to take fees. Of course, the great advocates of the Republic had no need to
do so directly; if Cicero did a client proud the client's purse, friends and influence
would be available to Cicero later at call. Nevertheless, the rule was constantly
being infringed and as constantly reiterated.
Id.
4. Casson, Imagine, If You Will a Time Without Any Lawyers at All, SMITHSONIAN,
Oct. 1987, at 122, 126.
5. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 50-55 (1953).
6. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 215 (5th ed. 1956).
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 216. Pound states that, "[pirofessional attorneys begin under Edward I," but
those were a special class of lawyers, akin to solicitors. R. POUND, supra note 5, at 86.
9. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 301-06; R. POUND, supra note 5, at 62-69.
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it may have been in recognition of the importance of this custom
that in some of our states there were internship requirements for
young lawyers even after they had passed the Bar examination.'0
In the direct relationship between lawyer and client with re-
spect to fees charged for services, the statements submitted by
lawyers tended until quite recently not to be particularized. One
corporate client of mine complained that lawyers' fees were treated
differently from those of everyone else from whom the corporation
purchased goods or services. That client and I happened to have a
retainer arrangement, with regular monthly payments and a year-
end adjustment. We were on an hourly basis of charging, and I
thought the client was entitled to know what the corporation was
being charged for different things. Hence, over the opposition of
some of my partners, I initiated the practice of detailing the work
and its cost to the client. My objecting partners thought that the
professional relationship entitled us simply to submit a statement
"for legal services rendered" during the period in question, and
that it was not any of the client's business how the charges were
computed or allocated, or for that matter, how much was charged.
We lawyers have been considered a profession for as long as
recognition has been given to professions in our Western society.
However, "profession" today no longer signifies, in the words of
Roscoe Pound, simply the practice of "a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of a public service."' 1 For example, Mike Tyson
is regarded as a professional, and I do not propose a personal chal-
lenge to him about his right to the designation.
Nevertheless, I think that for our present purposes we can go
along with Roscoe Pound. To me at least, the word profession
strongly implies an obligation to serve "in the public interest."
This is particularly true where the profession is, as we are, self-
governing to a great degree.
It is obvious, I suppose, although it needs constant restating,
that the proper functioning of the system of justice rests largely in
our hands. That is a very solemn obligation. Lawyers are often said
to be officers of the courts. That implies a lot of things. It should
mean that we share with our fellow lawyers on the bench the re-
sponsibility of making the formal justice system work. In its sim-
plest terms, this means that lawyers will be totally honest with the
courts and with each other. There is a difference between advanc-
ing new arguments and a failure to set forth honestly the present
10. E.g., New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
11. R. POUND, supra note 5, at 5.
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state of the law. There is a difference between abusing the deposi-
tion process and striving to resolve a matter equitably "in the
shortest possible time with the least amount of stress and at the
lowest possible cost to the client."' 2 That is what Chief Justice
Burger said should be the aim of every advocate.
A tremendous amount of law is practiced outside the courts, of
course, and it is there that our obligation must be stated more
broadly, as one running to the entire "system of justice," rather
than merely as serving as "officers of the court."
When I used the word commercialism at the beginning of this
address and I referred to it as a motivating factor, I meant only the
payment of compensation. Lawyers surely are entitled to be fairly
paid for what they do. But what they do, because they are profes-
sionals, must always be guided by what is good for the system of
justice, the integrity of the judicial process and their personal in-
tegrity. If this is turned around and the primary goal of lawyers is
to make money, then we are at a point one hundred eighty degrees
from where we started.
As we look back, there is probably no time in history when
ideal conditions obtained, with conduct matching duty and com-
pensation being totally fair. And, of course, in comparing the pre-
sent with the past, there is always a temptation to regard any time
before the present as "the good old days." Nevertheless, conditions
and attitudes do change, and lawyers, it must be kept in mind, are
part of a larger society and are affected by the mores of that soci-
ety. Given those caveats, let us examine some of the conditions
that exist today.
First, let us look at numbers. The American Bar Association
advises that:
In 1960, for example, only about 285,900 lawyers were admit-
ted to practice in the United States .... [In 1985 there were]
about 700,000. It is not uncommon today to find firms of over
three hundred lawyers, with offices not only in many states, but
in foreign countries as well. In the 1950s and 1960s, firms of that
size and geographic diversity were unknown.
... [In 1985 there were] some 110,000 women admitted to
practice and about 40% of the law school population . . . [was]
female. In 1960, there were about 7,500 women admitted to prac-
tice and approximately 1,900 were in law schools. In 1971, there
12. Address by Warren E. Burger, American Law Institute Annual Meeting, quoted in
"... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PRO-
FESSIONALISM: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
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were less than 5,600 students classified as members of minorities
in law school. In 1985, there were over 12,000.
In addition, the Bar is younger than it was in 1960. Of the
over 300,000 members of the ABA, half are 38 or under. Indeed,
the median age of all lawyers in the United States today is about
38. In 1960, on the other hand, the median age of practicing law-
yers was 46.13
There may have been a time in the early days of our country
when society produced a group of law students with a pretty ho-
mogeneous culture and commonly accepted standards of conduct.
That is simply not true anymore. Since it is not true, then the
Bar-and I include academics, judges and practicing lawyers-
ought to define as clearly as possible what it expects of lawyers,
what their obligations are to the system of justice and to their cli-
ents-in a word, what it means to be a lawyer and a professional.
These things should be instilled in lawyers at the first opportunity,
which of course is in law schools. They should be reinforced by
individual practitioners and the organized Bar, and they should be
adhered to and enforced by the courts.
As a central part of the development of a heightened sense of
professionalism, it should be recognized that the primary purpose
of a professional lawyer is not to amass a fortune but to develop
legal competence and to adhere to the high standards of the pro-
fession. For the competent professional, a comfortable living will in
all likelihood follow; and that is fine. But to substitute for high
professional competence and dedication the amassing of wealth is
fundamentally wrong. Not only is it wrong, but it will inevitably
lead to a loss of confidence by the public in lawyers, a concomitant
loss of faith in the administration of justice and in more rigorous
control of the Bar by legislatures and governmental agencies such
as the Federal Trade commission.
As most of you may know, the American Bar Association in
1985 named a commission to study the status of professionalism
among lawyers. Its Report," issued in 1986, discussed many
problems facing lawyers in the effort to sustain professionalism.
However, significantly I think, it said:
The Commission believes that many of the problems outlined in
this Report could begin to be addressed by subordinating a law-
yer's drive to make money as a primary goal of law practice.
The temptation to put profits first will always be great. In-
13. REPORT, supra note 12, at 251-52 (citations omitted).
14. REPORT, supra note 12.
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deed, the increase in competitive pressures on lawyers may make
the temptation greater now than at any period in history. How-
ever, financial reward should ultimately be the consequence of
good service. Activities directed primarily to the pursuit of wealth
will ultimately prove both self-destructive and destructive of the
fabric of trust between clients and lawyers generally. 5
Next, although one might think that an increase in the num-
ber of lawyers would result in lower fees to clients, that has not
proved to be the case. I am not quite sure why this is so. Fees
charged are higher and there is increased competition to obtain
and retain the clients who pay those fees.
The Supreme Court unlocked the door to advertising, 6 and
many people, both in and out of the profession, think this is good.
There are many good things about it; but one basic trouble is that
constitutionally unprotected advertising-that is, advertising
which is false, fraudulent or misleading-simply cannot be con-
trolled by the Bar. The real responsibility for controlling such ad-
vertising rests with the disciplinary commissions in the several
states, and they are insufficiently funded to exercise any meaning-
ful control.
17
Advertising by lawyers did not begin after the recent Supreme
Court decision. During the early days of the Republic, local papers
often carried advertisements by individuals setting out their quali-
fications for representing potential clients in all kinds of matters.
The advertisements were decorous, with powerful references, but
they were nevertheless advertisements. 8
15. Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
16. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
17. Telephone conversation between Carl H. Rolewick and the author (Apr. 1988). Mr.
Rolewick was Administrator of the Illinois Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
18. E.g., the following passage appeared in the July 1, 1835 edition of the Daily Na-
tional Intelligencer:
AMERICAN LAW AGENCY
The American and British Public are informed that the undersigned have es-
tablished Law Agencies in each of the United States and that claims of every
description will be carefully attended to through the medium of eminent and re-
sponsible counsel in each State, and personally by the undersigned in the State of
Maryland, and at Washington, in the District of Columbia.




Baltimore, Jan. 1, 1833 [sic].
REFERENCES:
We are of opinion that entire confidence may be placed in David Hoffman,
Esq. LL.D. Counsellor-at-Law in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in
his associate George W. Dobbin, Esq. and that claims entrusted to them will be
[Vol. 50
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In a recent issue of the Texas Bar Journal, there is set out a
portion of a letter written by John J. Good, the first President of
the Dallas Bar Association, to his wife. In the letter, dated April
15, 1861, Mr. Good said:
I have some business yet unfinished of here. Have a horse and
couple of yoke of oxen tied to a tree here in the shape of fees and
came very near getting another (fee) of 80 sheep, fine ones at
that, but alas I am underbid and the prospect has gone
glimmering .... 19
Over the years, advertising was found wanting by the Bar
which effectively terminated it. Now the wheel has turned again.
Advertising, I think, tends to move lawyers toward commercialism
and the drive for money. But it is constitutionally here and we
must live with it. Somehow it must be controlled.
The Bar many years ago was disturbed by the fact that some
lawyers undercharged what the Bar considered appropriate for
standard services. This occurred often in probate matters and in
simple real estate transactions. So the Bar established minimum
fee schedules, and in most instances the courts enforced them.
That was a pretty solid move toward commercialism in my view.
However, as you know, the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar0 said that this practice violated the antitrust laws.2 1
That was a good decision, but the discussion of the Court lent
weight to the argument that lawyers, after all, are in business just
like everybody else.
Although I am somewhat uncertain about my history on this
point, I can safely say that as recently as forty years ago, most
billing was on a transactional basis. That is to say, it was based on
attended to with ability, integrity, and promptitude.
John Marshall, Chief Justice U.S. Richmond
Edward Livingston, Secretary of State, U.S. Washington
N. Biddle, President Bank U.S. Philadelphia
Prime, Ward, King & Co. New York
Thomas H. Perkins & Sons, Boston
Robert Gilmor & Sons
Hoffman, Ben & Co.) Baltimore
Baring Brothers & Co.
Thomas Wilson & Co.) London
Bolton, Ogden & Co.
W. & G. Brown & Co.) Liverpool
23 Daily Nat'l Intelligencer 6995 (Washington D.C.), July 1, 1835.
19. Letter from John J. Good (April 15, 1861) to his wife, quoted in John J. Good, 38
TEX. B.J. 408 (1975) (emphasis added).
20. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
21. Id. at 791-92.
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what the lawyer involved thought was fair for the difficulty of the
matter, the expertise required, the time involved, the results
achieved and the like. Some lawyers charged simply on a contin-
gency basis. These cases, where the outcome was uncertain, largely
involved litigation in personal-injury cases. In some probate mat-
ters, however, the contingency principle was used by applying a
percentage to the size of the estate, even though recovery itself was
clearly not a matter of contingency.
There has been an erosion of transactional billing to one based
primarily on time. While at first hailed as an improvement, this
has had some adverse effects and has tempted lawyers to put in
more time than is either necessary or desirable on some matters
where they think they can collect their fees. In other instances, of
course, it tends to overlook results achieved.
A good illustration of the abuse of time billing is found in the
use of depositions. When depositions were introduced in the early
to mid-1930s, it was thought that by the disclosure which they
would achieve, the trial itself would become less of a game of
chance and that settlements would be more prompt.
Without going into the many abuses that have developed in
the deposition process, and the understandable inability of courts
to control it, it is enough for our purposes to say that more often
than not the use or abuse of depositions has greatly increased the
cost of litigation.2 In many large urban law offices there are so-
called "litigators" who never try cases, but who spend untold hours
taking depositions. When lawyers for both sides-or all sides-in a
piece of litigation do this without objection from their fellow law-
yers and expect to get paid for it on an hourly basis, then profes-
sional objectives are lost and greed takes over. The clients suffer
because no one is representing them; no one questions whether the
depositions are needed.
Some federal judges, however, are now beginning to question
those practices in early pretrial conferences. One Chicago judge re-
cently told me of a case where the lawyers planned depositions in
England, France and Japan. But when he questioned them it was
clear that a resolution of the issues in the case did not require the
taking of any of the depositions and he did not permit it. I am sure
the clients were happy with that decision.
Let me give you one example of an outrageous abuse of the
deposition process which occurred several years ago in Chicago. A
case was filed challenging the fairness of the price paid for stock in
22. REPORT, supra note 12, at 278-79.
[Vol. 50
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a company which had agreed to a takeover. I think you may accept
the fact that this was simply a "hold-up" case, one without any
basis except its nuisance value. The principal defendants were the
corporate entities involved, although the directors of the company
that had been taken over were named as defendants as well. The
case was settled between the class action plaintiffs and the corpo-
rate defendants and the directors were to be dismissed. The
amount to be paid to the plaintiffs and the fee to be paid to plain-
tiffs' counsel shocked my conscience, and it must have worried the
plaintiffs as well, because the matter would have to go to the court
for approval. Part of the settlement required the defendant direc-
tors to submit to further depositions. The whole thing was a sham.
Those additional depositions were taken only to build up time
records, primarily so that counsel for the plaintiffs could claim that
the fee sought for counsel would have some reasonable relationship
to the time spent, and so counsel could obtain the court's approval.
What a far cry that is from the ideal that Chief Justice Burger
recommended in the quotation I gave before. Thus, the increasing
use of time alone as a basis for billing is beginning to raise
problems of professionalism.
Another startling thing that is taking place is that any number
of large firms are now going into business or businesses which they
control or manage. Two extensive newspaper articles, one in the
National Law Journal" and the other in the Washington Post,2 1
described those activities in detail. Some of the businesses are re-
lated to the law firms' legal practice; others are not. For example,
one firm has set up an investment advisory service, and this func-
tions principally, I guess, to advise clients of the law firm. Another
has set up a lobbying entity in Washington, D.C. Another firm has
invested heavily in real estate development. In one case at least a
firm has joint venture real estate developments with one of its
principal clients.
Why do they do this? Well, they claim to serve their legal cli-
ents better by providing ancillary services: sort of a one-stop shop-
ping center. I suspect, however, that they could do just as well for
their law clients if they introduced them to competent financial
advisers, lobbyists or investors in real estate. I think the real rea-
son is money. They are financially successful firms or they would
not be able to build up investment pools. However, they are not
23. Stille, When Law Firms Start Their Own Business: The Lure of Bigger Profits,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 1.
24. Marcus, Lawyers Branch out from the Law, Washington Post, March, 13, 1986, at
Al, col. 4 (final ed.).
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content with that. They want more money. At a recent symposium
in which I had a small role, a representative of one of those firms
said it was exciting and great fun to engage in these activities.
That may be so, but should lawyers and law firms do it? In an
opinion written in 1955, Justice Jacobs of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey observed, "Perhaps society would be better served if
practicing attorneys were to remain full-time lawyers rather than
become part-time business men." 5
In England there is a current debate as to whether or not the
lawyers should have interdisciplinary partnerships. Some govern-
mental officials and many legislators want it, because it will mean
more control by them. The Barristers have, I believe, already said
no. The Law Society has not spoken.2 What we have in this coun-
try, of course, goes beyond interdisciplinary partnerships because
the firms themselves create the other entities, often with their own
partners in control and peopled by firm members.
Obviously, there are a multitude of conflict problems, but
under existing law those seem to be satisfied by prior full disclo-
sure. If one of these controlled businesses craters or if a real estate
development turns out to be disastrous, the issue of the adequacy
of disclosure could be interesting. The question of whether lawyers
should be permitted to engage in such business activities and at
the same time to practice law is one which I hope will attract the
attention of the Bar. 7
I will give one more example, one that is of course known to
all of us, and that is the beginning salaries paid to associates by
major law firms in major cities. Law students have commented to
me that what is going on makes no sense, and that if the scale
keeps going up it will indicate even greater stupidity. Chief Judge
John Grady of the federal district court in Chicago put a little dif-
ferent emphasis on the practice when he said:
For [the associate] to come to any conclusion other than the fact
that the dollar is what the practice is all about would require
some sort of superhuman mental gyration on his part, because all
of the stimuli to which he's exposed indicate the exact reverse.
The buck is what it's about. Get it, get it now... [W]hat are you
worth a year later when you know something, or five years later
25. In re Carlson, 17 N.J. 338, 346, 111 A.2d 393, 397 (1955).
26. Letter from John Mottram, Chief Executive of the General Council of the Bar,
England, to the author (Sept. 29, 1987) (enclosing "Comments on Behalf of the London
Common Law and Commercial Bar Association on Law Society's Paper on Multi-Discipli-
nary Partnerships (Draft Copy)").
27. I have discussed this question at greater length in Stanley, Lawyers in Business, 8
N. ILL. U.L. REV. 17 (1987).
[Vol. 50
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when you know a little more? Where does it stop?28
As you can tell from what I have said, I think that all these
things that are going on lead to the conclusion that John Grady
reached: the buck is what it is all about. Put in more polite terms,
commercialism seems to be taking over from professionalism. And
it is adversely affecting our profession. In my area at least there is
less civility in the courtroom. More and more lawyers refuse to be
bound by any commitment when it is not in writing. Lawsuits
without merit are increasingly filed because it is economically wiser
for defendants to settle rather than to fight for principle. Abuse of
process takes place when an economically strong litigant faces a
weaker one. And how many times do lawyers become handmaidens
of their clients who instruct them to ruin the opponents?
These abuses of process and of the high standards of our pro-
fession can be corrected only if we lawyers do something about it.
Happily, some things are taking place which are encouraging,
although there is a long way to go. I referred earlier to the work of
the ABA Commission on Professionalism. That Report," which I
commend to you, made a number of specific recommendations for
action addressed to the law schools, the practicing lawyers, the or-
ganized Bar and the judiciary. The Report has had wide circula-
tion and has received generally favorable comment. Further, it has
resulted in some preliminary action.
For example, a number of law schools have made the Report
part of the courses they are offering on legal ethics and profession-
alism. 0 In January of last year, the 1988 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools had as the theme for its Ple-
nary Session "The Law School's Opportunity to Shape the Legal
Profession: Money, Morals and Social Obligation." The Report of
the ABA Commission was the focal point of the discussion. An in-
creasing number of state and local Bar associations have them-
selves undertaken studies of professionalism and legal ethics. 1
Many of us associated with the work of the Commission have been
invited to talk about its work or to write articles about it. All of
this is good.
I regret that the ABA has taken no significant action to imple-
ment our Report despite the fact that it named an implementation
committee in 1986 and that in some instances all we recommended
28. J. GRADY, Commentary, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL
REVISITED 30 (J.B. Davidson ed. 1985).
29. REPORT, supra note 12.
30. E.g., Cornell, University of Pennsylvania.
31. E.g., Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts.
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was study, such as a study of the propriety of lawyers in business.32
But the Report is beginning to develop a life of its own, and the
keen interest of the law schools, of some groups within the ABA,
and of state and local Bars gives assurance that its message will
not die.
Central to the success of the changes which we need to make
will be the attitude of the judiciary. The judges' role must be a
much stronger one than it has been in the past. They can no longer
make the same assumptions about the profession that they used to.
They must be fair, of course, but they must be realistic, firm and
tough.
What is needed is not simply pleas for us to reach for aspira-
tional goals, although there is nothing wrong with that. In large
part, I suppose, what we seek and believe in are things of the
spirit. But we must be practical, too. And practicality says to us
that if we do not act, we are going to become a commercial enter-
prise, regulated by others, and without independence. And when
that happens, the system of justice will be quite different from the
one we know. I fear greatly then for the individual and his or her
rights.
Despite what I have just said, I am not pessimistic. It is my
observation, as it was of our Commission, 3 that there are a tre-
mendous number of fine people practicing law in these United
States, people of high competence and high ideals. They do impor-
tant pro bono work. They serve their clients and the system of jus-
tice well. All we have to do is get their attention. Their support
will follow.
32. REPORT, supra note 12, at 280-81.
33. Id. at 304-05.
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